Islamic University

The head of internal security of Israel, Yuval Diskin told the cabinet on Wednesday that Hamas’s ability to govern has been “…
However, the pressure of public opinion in the Arab countries forcing their leaders to continue fighting Israel. As part of this struggle, Egypt continued to support war, and drive a military alliance with Syria in 1966. Both Syria and Egypt were backed by the Soviet Union.
On May 17, 1967, Egypt has formally requested the withdrawal of UN troops interposition (UNEF), and started remilitarizar the Sinai and the border with Israel. On May 23 the same year, Egypt blocked the Straits of Tiran, which according to Israel contradicted the maritime laws and the UN was due to war. On May 30, the popular pressure on Jordan to King Hussein achievement away from its traditional alliance with the Western powers and forced to join the Egyptian-Syrian alliance, giving the command of its forces to an Egyptian general. On June 4 Iraq joined the coalition.
Although the government of Israel does not want war and feared, the Israeli military believed that it was necessary to strike immediately because without the advantage of surprise, Israel could not survive. Israel had mobilized reservists and could not maintain that mobilization indefinitely. Faced with the choice of attacking or demobilize not received any assurance from the U.S. of an international initiative to boost and with the Egyptian government daily public showing of his desire not to cool the situation, the government of Israel and forget their reluctance followed the advice of his generals. Other doubt that the Arabs, despite all the intense bellicose rhetoric and the buildup of troops on the border, they were really ready to attack Israel. Ted Thornton says even that “Egyptian troop movements were a pretext, had long planned for Israeli troops won more territory.” This source quotes Yitzhak Rabin, who said a year after the war:
I do not think I would like Nasser war. The two divisions he sent to Sinai in May 1967 had not been sufficient to launch an offensive against Israel. the wise and what we knew.
Le Monde, February 1968.
But we know that Egypt will not send only two, but seven divisions 2 ª, 3rd rd, 4A meetings, Shazli Force, 6à meetings, and 20A ª ª 7A) with 100 thousand soldiers and 1,000 tanks, against the Israeli border. 5 Divisions were in the Sinai and Gaza 2. These figures are consistent with other sources, such as:
Egypt had bet seven divisions, 100,000 men and 1,000 tanks.
alvaro Abos, “Political developments of the century” – Volume 9 The Six-Day War, page 41.
So it is doubtful or at least taken out of context, the alleged quote from Rabin, as a general size of the deployment could not ignore Egyptian and minimize much less.
Also offered Israel peace in an official at the UN on October 8, 1968, proposing to return to the armistice lines of 1949 with a special status for Jerusalem (City Unified and Open), which flatly rejects a war of expansion. The Israeli proposal of 9 points, was rejected by the Arabs, as well as Resolutions 242 and 194 .-
But sources show that the deployment of seven Egyptian divisions:. could not leave any doubt Rabin, or their number (seven), or their disposal nor its purpose.
Menachem Begin, then the match Gahal also said years later:
In June 1967 we had an option again. The concentration of Egyptian troops in Sinai did not prove that Nasser was really attacking. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.
New York Times, August 21, 1982.
However, in view of the Israeli president Chaim Herzog (military analyst during the conflict), this was not the opinion of the Israeli military in 1967 nor are they the other Israeli military historians who have dealt extensively with the war, Michael B . Oren, who generally argue, from the detailed study of documents and interviews with his players, that Israel had no choice from the military point of view. So, Chaim Herzog said that the situation in which Israel was surrounded by a huge Arab armies that exceeded troops, planes and tanks, had no option to speculate on whether they were really ready to attack, because no “strategic depth” in which to deploy and, therefore, able to answer:
In 1967, when it became clear that the war was just around the corner, the Israeli leadership concluded that it should not be allowed to make the first move Arabs because, by its own weight, get a head start that Israel could not cope
Chaim Herzog, The War of Yom Kippur, unpublished, 2004, pp. israel First, these rocket attacks must stop. … Israel attacked the Islamic University in Gaza without causing deaths …
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The West Bank and Gaza Strip by Elisha Efrat (Kindle Edition – April 16, 2007)Kindle Book

| December 14th, 2013 | Posted in General |

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